October 22, 2013

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Is a franchisee’s outlet licence a retail premises lease?

In an interesting recent decision from the Supreme Court,[1] Croft J held that an arbitration clause in a retail leases does not oust the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

A detailed discussion of this issue can be found on Robert Hay’s blog here and here.

The Court also referred to a finding at first instance that the franchisee’s outlet licence is in fact a sub-lease.  This creates an interesting issue for practitioners acting for franchisees, franchisors and their landlords.

A common arrangement for a franchise in Victoria involves the franchisor:

  1. taking a head lease from the land owner;  and
  2. granting a franchise agreement and an ‘outlet licence’ to the franchisee.

In these arrangements, the franchisee is ordinarily not treated as a tenant of a retail premises lease.

However, it is well established that an agreement in substance creating a lease will be treated by the courts as a lease, even though the parties choose to call it a licence.

This was considered by the Tribunal at paragraphs [13] to [41] of the decision at first instance in Ireland v Subway Systems Australia Pty Ltd & Anor Retail Tenancies [2012] VCAT 1061, in which Senior Member Riegler quoted the colourful words of Lord Templeton in Street v Mountford:[2]

The manufacture of a five pronged implement for manual digging results in a fork even if the manufacturer, unfamiliar with the English language, insists that he intended to make and has made a spade.

After considering the text of the agreement, the surrounding circumstances and other relevant authorities, the Tribunal concluded that the outlet licence in fact granted exclusive possession to the franchisee and was a sub-lease.

If, as the Tribunal’s decision suggests, a franchisee’s outlet licence can be regarded as, in substance, a sub-lease, the consequences could be significant.

For example:

  1. the Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) will almost always apply to the franchisee’s outlet licence.  That means, for example, that the franchisee is entitled to a disclosure statement, an estimate of outgoings and a five year minimum term and that s 52 of the RLA governs the franchisor’s repair and maintenance obligations;
  2. there is an interesting question over whether the head lease to the franchisor is a retail premises lease for the purposes of the RLA;  and
  3. it is controversial whether a licensee (as opposed to a tenant) has standing to seek relief from forfeiture if the licence is terminated.  However, if the franchisee is in fact a sub-tenant, then there is no doubt that it has standing to seek relief from forfeiture.

What, then, happens if the terms of the franchise agreement are inconsistent provisions of the RLA?

In the Subway case, Croft J refers this problem and to the fact that the franchise agreement in that case was with another entity within the franchisor’s group of companies.  However, while expressing a view that the RLA may render specific provisions of a franchise agreement void if those provisions were inconsistent with specific provisions of the RLA, his Honour did not need to finally resolve this question (see paragraphs [61] to [67]).

The point for practitioners to note at this stage is that a franchisee’s outlet licence may well be characterised as a sub-lease, which could give to the franchisee significant leverage when the franchise agreement comes to an end.  The extent of that leverage will, as always, depend on the circumstances.

The Tribunal’s determination that the outlet licence was in fact a sub-lease was not appealed and Croft J expressly left the question open: see paragraph [61].

October 21, 2013

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Management fees – Practice Note for LIV’s November 2012 lease revision

Robert Hay and Derry Devine of the Law Institute of Victoria’s Leases Committee have written a practice note about an issue with the November 2012 edition of the LIV’s standard lease.

Any practitioner using the November 2012 revision of that LIV standard lease should be aware of the practice note, which states that:

“When using the LIV Commercial lease for a retail premises lease containing an option to renew and under which management fees will be payable, it is recommended that:

    • Item 10 of the Schedule be modified by deleting the paragraph beginning ‘If the Act applies’ and ending ‘section 49(4)’.
    • The information relating to the amount of the management fee and the method of calculating the amount payable by the tenant, for the first accounting period of the lease term, be specified in the disclosure statement rather than the lease.  This will satisfy section 49(1)(b) without creating potential issues where an option is exercised.  When an option is exercised, the disclosure statement for the new term should also specify the management fee and the method of calculating the amount payable by the tenant for the first accounting period of the new lease.”

Robert’s blog post about the practice note is available here.

October 2, 2013

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Costs of essential safety measures and s 251 of the Building Act

Whether a landlord can pass on the costs of complying with the Building Act 1993 has been the source of a significant debate over the last year or so.

A recent article of mine on this issue has been published in the Law Institute Journal here.

In summary, the article suggests that:

  1. the better view is that landlords are able to recover from tenants the costs of compliance with the Building Act 1993 (Vic), including the costs of essential safety measures, at least where the landlord has incurred the cost itself;  and
  2. in light of recent consternation on the issue, either legislative amendment or a test case in the Supreme Court is required.

Some background to the debate is available here, here, here, here and here.

September 5, 2013

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Is a stated intention to exercise an option sufficient to create a new agreement to lease? Part 2

A recent VCAT decision, discussed here, discussed a decision in which a letter stating that the tenant intended to exercise its option was equivocal and did not create a binding contract between the parties.

In a recent decision from the Magistrates Court of Victoria, Magistrate Ginnane considered a similarly worded letter signed by the tenant and the surrounding authorities (including the recent VCAT decision cited above) and concluded that:

18.  In my judgement I think it would be artificial to elevate the importance of the word, “intentions” when considering the whole of the letter and the surrounding circumstances. Mr. Oswald-Jacobs characterised the expression as an everyday figure of speech. I agree. I am not satisfied that the letter from NEA is couched in equivocal language such that the invitation contained in the body of the letter was uncertain.

While it remains prudent to avoid words like ‘intend’ in documents associated with the exercise of an option and each decision will depend upon its circumstances, Magistrate Ginnane’s decision should provide some comfort to landlords or tenants who find themselves facing a similarly worded document.

A copy of the decision of Zuzic & Zuzic v Honeybee Toys Pty Ltd & Ors [2013] VMC 22 is available on Austlii.

Thanks to Peter Lowenstern of the REIV for alerting me to this decision and to Robert Hay for discussing it with me.

September 4, 2013

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Service station leases – a Victorian perspective

A colleague recently sent me this excellent article by Bill Burrough from DibbsBarker titled ‘Service station lease: Ensuring the lease is manageable and saleable’.

The article talks about:

  1. leasing issues for investors considering a service station – an investment considered by some to be ‘recession proof’;  and
  2. the obligation to maintain the service station infrastructure and the impact of retail leasing and environmental legislation in Queensland and NSW.

The article also says:

It is common for the landlord to install and retain ownership of the infrastructure, while the tenant is obliged to carry out repairs and maintenance throughout the term. Replacement of certain items which reach the end of their useful life is normally considered to be a capital expense and would usually be the landlord’s responsibility.

This is good advice.  However, there may be a hidden trap for Victorian practitioners in the Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic).

Section 52(2) of that Act says:

The landlord is responsible for maintaining in a condition consistent with the condition of the premises when the retail premises lease was entered into:

a)    the structure of, and fixtures in, the retail premises; and

b)    plant and equipment at the retail premises; and

c)     the appliances, fittings and fixtures provided under the lease by the landlord relating to the gas, electricity, water, drainage or other services.

There is also an exception in s 52(3), which states that:

However, the landlord is not responsible for maintaining those things if—

(a) the need for the repair arises out of misuse by the tenant; or

(b) the tenant is entitled or required to remove the thing at the end of the lease.

Importantly, under s 94 of the RLA, the parties cannot contract out of the covenants implied by the Act, including s 52.

Consequently, if the service station is a retail premises leases and the exception in s 52(3) does not apply, the landlord is probably responsible for maintaining the service station infrastructure.  This could be costly.

It is, of course, important to check whether the lease is governed by the RLA.  For example, a lease to a major petrol retailer is likely to be excluded by the public company exclusion (see s 4(2)(c) and (d) of the RLA).  However, a lease or a sub-lease to a franchisee will probably fall under the Act.

 Readers advising their clients in this area should also be aware that:
  1. there are a number of unresolved issues associated with attempting to recover the costs of maintenance from a tenant as an outgoing under s 52 of the RLA (see an earlier post here);
  2. the recovery of capital costs is prohibited under s 41 of the RLA;  and
  3. there is an ongoing issue over whether the costs compliance with essential safety measures can be recovered from the tenant (see earlier posts here and here).

Sam Hopper and Kate Brideoake

September 3, 2013

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What is a retail premises? The ultimate consumer test.

Here is an excellent summary by Robert Hay of the recent decision of Fitzroy Dental Pty Ltd v Metropolitan Management Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 344 .

As many of you know, a retail sale is generally considered to be a sale to the ultimate consumer.  The question in that case was whether the conference provider or the attendees at the conferences were the ultimate consumers.

His Honour Justice Croft held that the conference providers were the ultimate consumer and that the RLA applied as the retail sale was the hiring of the conference facility.  The Court divided the hiring of the conference centre and the conference itself into two transactions.  Consequently, the conference provider was an ultimate consumer, even though they may on sell (or give) tickets to the conference itself.

Sam Hopper and Kate Brideoake

August 13, 2013

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Willmott appeal heard

Last Friday, 9 August 2013, the High Court heard an appeal against the Victorian Court of Appeal’s decision in Willmott Forests Ltd (Receivers and Managers appointed)(in liquidation) v Willmott Growers Group Inc and Willmott Action Group Inc [2012] VSCA 202.

For those following the development of the case, the transcript of the hearing can be found here and the transcript of the earlier application for special leave to appeal can be found here.

The details and implications of the decision are discussed and links to other online discussions are contained in earlier posts on this blog.

Another interesting discussion of the case by Minter Ellison can be found here.

Sam Hopper and Thomas Steains

August 13, 2013

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Waving goodbye to waiver

Here is an excellent blog post by my friend and colleague Travis Mitchell.
Like Travis, I occasionally see allegations of waiver in correspondence or court documents. Travis’s post provides a useful outline on what waiver means or doesn’t mean, depending on your perspective.

travismitchell's avatarEquity, Trusts and More

It’s been almost five years since the High Court confirmed that Australian law does not recognise a standalone legal doctrine of waiver, Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner (2008) 238 CLR 570.  Waiver is really a shorthand description of the result of the doctrines of election, estoppel, variation by contract and release.  As Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ said in Gardiner, waiver is one of a number of “solving words” which are “but substitutes for thought” and as one of a number of “pseudo-conceptions” or “soft spots in what appears a hard legal crust”.

But from time to time I still come across pleadings or submissions that a party has ‘waived’ contractual rights, without saying more. A defence in that form is risky.  Although the intended result may be the same, each of the doctrines is made up of its own distinct elements that must be satisfied…

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August 12, 2013

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Finding the ‘current’ versions of the 1986 and 1998 Acts

I am often asked how to find the ‘current’ versions of the Retail Tenancies Act 1986 (Vic) and the Retail Tenancies (Reform) Act 1998 (Vic).  To understand why this question is hard to answer, it helps to understand some of the background to the legislation.

The 1986 Act was repealed by the 1998 Act.  However, the 1986 Act continues to govern leases entered into between 1986 and 1998.[1]

The 2003 Act repealed the 1998 ActHowever, the 1998 Act continued to govern leases that were entered into between 1998 and 2003.[2]

Consequently, there are still retail leases floating around that are governed by either the 1986 or the 1998 Act (although they are becoming very rare).

The 2003 Act also made changes to the 1986 and 1998 Acts.[3]  Those amendments took effect at the same time as the 1998 Act was repealed (or, possibly, the nanosecond or day before).

As a result, if you look for the latest version of either the 1986 or the 1998 Act on the Victorian Government website, you will only see a note recording that the Act has been repealed.

The Retail Leases (Amendment) Act 2005 (Vic) also made amendments to the 1986 and 1998 Acts.

So, on the rare occasions when you come across 1986 or 1998 Act leases, the question is: ‘How do I find the “current” version of the 1986 and 1998 Acts?’

The short answer is to follow these links:

If those links aren’t working, here is the long answer.

Starting with the 1998:

  1. go to this website: http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/;
  2. click on Victorian Law Today;
  3. check the circle marked ‘Acts’;
  4.  click on the link marked ‘R’;
  5. click on the link marked ‘Retail Tenancies Reform Act 1998;
  6. open the drop-down menu on the bottom left-hand side of the screen marked ‘Click here to Show Version History‘;  and
  7. follow the link to version 18, current at 4/30/2003.

You should then be able to open a version of the Act that states on the first page that it incorporates amendments as at 30 April 2003.  However, if you look at the end of the Act (p 71), you will see that it contains amendments made by the 2005 Act.

Similarly, for the 1986 Act:

  1. repeat steps 1-4 above;
  2. click on the link marked ‘Retail Tenancies  Act 1986’;
  3. repeat step 6 above;  and
  4. follow the link to version 31, current at 06/30/1998.

Again, the title page says that it incorporates amendments as at 30 June 1998.  However, the notations in the Act show that it incorporates amendments from the 2005 Act (see p 52).


[1] Check the acts for the precise dates in which the regimes changed.

[2] See note 1.

[3] The main purpose seems to have been to make some of the procedural requirements in the old acts the same as under the new (eg the requirement to give between six and 12 months notice of the last date to exercise an option).

May 11, 2013

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Disclaimer of a lease by a landlord’s liquidator – Growers granted special leave to appeal

The High Court yesterday granted special leave to appeal the Court of Appeal’s decision in Willmott Forests Ltd (Receivers and Managers appointed)(in liquidation) v Willmott Growers Group Inc and Willmott Action Group Inc [2012] VSCA 202.

In a decision that has prompted a flurry of online discussions, the Court of Appeal held that a liquidator appointed to a landlord company could use the disclaimer power to extinguish leases granted by that company and sell the land free of the tenant’s interests.  The details and implications of the decision are discussed and links to other online discussions are contained in earlier posts on this blog here.

The grant of special leave, however, is only the first step in the appeal to the High Court.  The appeal will now be listed for a full hearing.  At this stage, a hearing is expected in August 2013.

In the meantime, the Court of Appeal’s decision still stands and practitioners should consider advising their tenant clients that:

  1. the Court of Appeal’s decision is subject to a High Court appeal.   However, while the appeal is pending, the decision remains good law.  For the implications of the decision for tenants, have a look at the discussion here;
  2. in the unlikely event that tenants receive a notice of disclaimer of their lease from their landlord’s liquidator, they should consider immediately making an application to set aside the disclaimer under s 568B of the Corporations Act.  That application ordinarily needs to be made within 14 days of the liquidator’s notice of disclaimer.  They should also consider challenging in the same proceeding whether a landlord’s Liquidator has power to disclaim the lease;  and
  3. if the High Court overturns the Court of Appeal’s decision, the risk of their lease being unilaterally extinguished by a liquidator using the disclaimer power should be removed.  However, if the High Court affirms that decision, the risk remains permanently.

Also, tenants are unlikely to understand the significance of a notice of disclaimer in these circumstances. It is not hard to imagine a tenant approaching a practitioner for advice close to the expiry of the 14 day limit (see text in bold above).  Consequently, practitioners should pay particular attention to the 14 day time limit to avoid a claim being made against them for missing the deadline.

Practitioners acting for liquidators should consider advising their clients of the grant of special leave and, if they are liquidators of landlord companies, to consider the risk of a successful appeal before disclaiming any leases.

Trustees in bankruptcy have a similar disclaimer power under the Bankruptcy Act, so practitioners acting for trustees in bankruptcy of landlords should consider giving them the same advice.