Hot off the press, I have just seen the third edition of Croft J and Robert Hay’s The Mortgagee’s Power of Sale. The book is available for sale through LexisNexis Butterworths.
I commend the book to all readers.
Hot off the press, I have just seen the third edition of Croft J and Robert Hay’s The Mortgagee’s Power of Sale. The book is available for sale through LexisNexis Butterworths.
I commend the book to all readers.
November 29, 2012
The decision referred to in my previous post in now attached as follows, for those interested in reading it:
McIntyre & Anor v Kucminska Holdings Pty Ltd _Retail Tenancies_ [2012] VCAT 1766
November 29, 2012
Those following the recent debate on whether a landlord can recover from a tenant the costs of essential safety measures as an outgoing under a lease in light of s 251 of the Building Act, a decision of Senior Member Riegler published today states that:
[69] It is clear that the express terms of the lease required the Tenant to arrange for an essential safety measures report and to purchase whatever fire fighting equipment was required in order to comply with such a report. In my view, s.251 of the Building Act 1993 does not necessarily prohibit a landlord from placing such an obligation on a tenant, save and except that the Landlord must reimburse the Tenant for the costs associated therewith, failing which the Tenant is entitled to set-off those costs against rent due and payable under the lease. The relevant regulation does not state that the owner of the land must be the entity that carries out the relevant work but merely states that the owner must ensure that the essential safety measures are carried out. The regulation does not prohibit a landlord from placing a contractual obligation on a tenant to undertake that work, albeit that the landlord ultimately remains legislatively responsible to ensure that the work is carried out.
I will post a summary of the decision as soon as I can.
Thank you to Derry Devine for alerting me to this paragraph.
The decision is not on AustLii yet.
November 20, 2012
After passing through the upper house on 15 November 2012, the Retail Leases Amendment Bill 2012 (Vic) received Royal Assent today. It will come into operation tomorrow.
At the time of this post, the Retail Leases Amendment Act 2012 (Vic) has not yet made its way onto the Victorian parliamentary website. The consolidated version of the Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) on the Parliamentary website has not yet been updated to reflect the amendments.
A summary of the bill and its significance can be found in an earlier post here.
Importantly for practitioners, landlords will no longer need to report new or renewed leases to the Office of the Small Business Commissioner.
Thank you to Mark Schramm at the Office of the Small Business Commissioner for alerting me to this.
Sam Hopper and Imogen White
November 9, 2012
The recent decision of Senior Member Steele at VCAT in Computer & Parts Land Pty Ltd v Property Sunrise Pty Ltd (Retail Tenancies) [2012] VCAT 1522 gives some guidance on when a landlord can resist exercise of an option by the tenant of a retail premises lease.
Section 27(2) of the Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) states that (emphasis added):
(2) If a retail premises lease contains an option exercisable by the tenant to renew the lease for a further term, the only circumstances in which the option is not exercisable is if—
(a) the tenant has not remedied any default under the lease about which the landlord has given the tenant written notice; or
(b) the tenant has persistently defaulted under the lease throughout its term and the landlord has given the tenant written notice of the defaults.
Whenever a landlord wants to resist the exercise of an option by a tenant for breaches throughout the term, there is an issue over whether the tenant has ‘persistently’ defaulted.
Senior Member Steele held that:
14. For the Landlord, Mr Sam Wallace gave evidence (in his statement dated 20 July 2012) alleging that the tenant defaulted on nine occasions, in that in nine different months the rent was paid late, in varying degrees up to 5 weeks. The Tenant’s evidence amounted to admission that the rent was indeed late on eight of those occasions, but the Tenant contended that there were good reasons.
15. The Tenant (in the statement of Mr Jin Wang dated 29 June 2012) said this was on some occasions because the Landlord’s agent had allocated payments wrongly to some item other than rent. Further, Mr Wang said that in early 2011 the rent was late because the Landlord’s agent had sent inaccurate invoices which failed to take into account the 35% rebate ordered by the Tribunal on 11 February 2011. The months in which it appeared rent was late, whatever the reason were: February to May 2010 and February, March and May to July 2011.
16. The Tenant contended that its defaults in rental payment were not persistent and did not occur throughout the term and that the landlord had not properly given written notice of the defaults.
17. For the meaning of “persistent” in this context the Landlord referred to Westgate Battery Company Pty Ltd v G.C.A. Pty Ltd [2005] VCAT 2080. It appeared from the evidence described in that case (at paragraph 50 of the reasons given by Senior Member Lothian) that there had been 22 months in which the rent was paid late and that on average it was 25 days late. In considering whether this was a “persistent” default, the learned senior member said:
“54. Mr Hanak referred me to definitions of “persistent” and “persist” in the Macquarie Dictionary and the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. From the Macquarie he directed me to “persisting, esp. in spite of opposition, etc; persevering”. The third definition in the Macquarie is “continued; constantly repeated.” It is a precise description of the tenant’s behaviour. Further, the repeated failure to pay rent on time persisted beyond the date upon which the tenant purported to exercise the option. The breach of the obligation to pay persisted throughout the term of the lease since transfer of the lease to the tenant, up to and beyond the purported exercise of the option.”
18. It follows that the learned senior member considered in that case that the number or frequency of late payments of rent amounted to “persistent” breaches.
19. The parties also referred to the helpful comments of Senior Member Davis in Westside Real Estate Investments Pty Ltd (ACN 073 019 416) v Nguyen and Ors [2011] VCAT 1830. He noted the definitions of “persistent” referred to by Senior Member Lothian in the above case and said (at paragraph 22):
“In this particular instance, there had been many incidents of the tenant failing to pay rent on the time prescribed by the lease. The fact that the tenant believed it was entitled to a tax invoice, in my view is not relevant. The tenant has an obligation to seek out its creditor, in this case the landlord, whether invoices are provided or not. Even if the tenant, who is an estate agent, actually believed that it needed to be supplied with a tax invoice, it does not take the matter any further. The fact is that the tenant should have been aware of its obligations. If it was not aware of its obligations, the landlord cannot be held responsible. Being late with the rent over many months going into years, is something that in my view is caught by the provision of s.27(2)(b) and Clause 12.1.2 of the lease. That is the tenant’s rent payments were persistently late.”
20. At paragraph 26, the learned senior member said “the breach in paying the rent had occurred so often and with such frequency that it must come within the meaning of persistent”. It appeared from the evidence recited earlier in the senior member’s reasons for decision that there had been sixteen occasions when the rent was paid late and that on some of those occasions it was over a year late.
21. In the present case the rent was late on at most nine occasions. On none of those occasions was it more than five weeks late. The term of the lease was 48 months, albeit the respondent had at the time when the Tenant purported to exercise the option been Landlord for only for perhaps 24 of those. The nine occasions on which rent was late occurred over two particular stretches. Otherwise, the rent was apparently paid on time. In those circumstances, I was not persuaded that the late payments could be described as “persistent” (in the sense of “persevering” or “constantly repeated”), nor that they occurred “throughout” the term of the lease.
22. There was a dispute before me as to whether the Landlord had given the notices required by s27 (2)(b) concerning rental payments. Since the breaches in rental payments do not fall within the description in section 27(2)(b), it is unnecessary for me to decide whether the Landlord gave the Tenant written notice as the section requires.
This decision highlights that:
1. it is essential for landlords to give defaulting tenants notice in writing each time they default and ensure that records of delivery are kept;
2. whether a particular tenant’s breaches are enough to satisfy the test of ‘persistently default[ing] under the lease throughout its term …’ will depend on the facts of each case, the most important of which appear at this stage to be:
(a) the number of defaults;
(b) the extent of the default (in the case of late payment of rent, the duration of the default);
(c) whether the breaches occurred ‘throughout’ the term or over a discrete period or periods; and
(d) the length of the lease term; and
3. bearing 2 above in mind, some guidance on whether a tenant’s defaults are likely to be considered to be ‘persistent’ can be obtained from the following:
(a) tenants have been held to have persistently defaulted when rent was paid on average 25 days late over 22 months during the term and when rent was paid late on 16 occasions and on some of those occasions it was over a year late; and
(b) a tenant was held not to be persistently in default when rent was paid late on at most 9 occasions, none of those payments were more than 5 weeks late, in a term of 48 months, each breach occurred over two particular stretches and otherwise the rent was apparently paid on time.
October 18, 2012
My friend and colleague Bill Stark has just posted on his blog a useful summary of the New South Wales Court of Appeal’s decision in BBB Constructions Pty Ltd v Aldi Foods Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 224.
In that case, the developer unsuccessfully sued Aldi for damages after Aldi withdrew from lease negotiations. Executed leases had not been exchanged but the developer had started construction on the site.
Bill’s comprehensive post is available here.
It concludes with the following advice:
When engaging in negotiations of any kind, it is important to recognise that you may become legally bound to the deal if you are not extremely careful in addressing the issue of when you have reached an agreement.
It is always a good idea to state in writing early for example “We will not be bound by any agreement until formal documents are signed and exchanged”.
I agree entirely with Bill’s advice.
The reverse is, of course, also true – it is a good idea to ensure that the you have signed agreements before spending money in reliance on the assumed agreement.
October 17, 2012
Mark Brennan, Victoria’s inaugural Small Business Commissioner, has been appointed as the inaugural Federal Small Business Commissioner.
Mr Brennan conducted the review of the Retail Tenancies (Reform) Act 1998 (Vic) which led to the Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) and the Small Business Commissioner Act 2003 (Vic).
Mr Brennan was then appointed as Victoria’s first Small Business Commissioner. He served in that role from 2003 to 2010 and was then appointed as Victoria’s Liquor Licensing Commissioner in 2010.
For more details on Mr Brennan’s appointment and career highlights, see the BRW report on his appointment available here.
Congratulations to Mark on a worthy appointment.
October 11, 2012
For those interested in the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in the Willmott case, the decision was referred to recently by Beach J in the Victorian Supreme Court decision of Grant v Harlgate Pty Ltd & Anor [2012] VSC 464 (9 October 2012).
The decision is also relevant to conveyancing lawyers faced with an insolvent vendor.
In that case the vendor under a contract of sale was placed into liquidation. The Liquidators sought to disclaim the contract of sale prior to settlement. The purchaser stated in responsive correspondence that it considered the contract of sale to have been rescinded. The purchaser sued the stakeholder (joining the vendor) to recover her deposit.
Relying on Warren CJ and Sifris J’s joint judgment in the Willmott case, the plaintiff sought repayment of the deposit on the grounds that disclaimer terminated the contract of sale. The stakeholder sought to resist this on grounds that the purchaser’s equitable interest in the land created under the contract of sale survived the disclaimer.
However, neither party were pressing for settlement of the contract of sale and Beach J found that:
43 The present position is the liquidators have, on behalf of the vendor, disclaimed the contract of sale. The date for settlement has passed, and neither party to the contract of sale seeks its completion or settlement. The deposit was paid to the first defendant as a stakeholder, pending payment to the vendor, or otherwise, in accordance with the provisions of the Sale of Land Act. Circumstances entitling the vendor to payment of the deposit have never arisen. The plaintiff is entitled to the return of the deposit, together with interest. Alternatively, she is entitled to damages equivalent to the amount of the deposit and interest. It is no answer to the plaintiff’s claim that at the time of disclaimer, either or both of the parties to the contract may have had some pre-existing interest or right. What is clear from the evidence is that on and from 23 August 2012, the vendor has not sought to complete the contract (and has been prepared to treat the contract as being at an end); and that from 3 September 2012, the plaintiff has been content to accept this position.
44 Further, it is now tolerably clear (receivers and managers having subsequently been appointed on 19 September) that, without any default on the part of the plaintiff, the contract of sale will not be completed. The contact was terminated on 3 September 2012, if not on 23 August. In the circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment for the amount of the deposit, together with interest.
As I read the decision, the Court found that the parties to the contract of sale were both treating the contract of sale as being at an end and, one way or another, the contract would not now be performed. As a result, the deposit was to be repaid and the question of the effect of disclaimer did not arise.
Thanks to my colleagues Garry Bigmore QC, Bill Rimmer and Matt Kennedy for discussing this case with me.
October 10, 2012
My friend Robert Hay has added a post on his blog about an interesting case that considered whether an arbitration clause could oust VCAT’s jurisdiction under the Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic). I have reblogged the post for readers here.
In Ireland v Subway Systems Australia Pty Ltd and Subway Realty Pty Ltd [2012] VCAT 1061 a tenant contended if an agreement (which it contended was a licence) was held to be a lease then the dispute had to be determined by an arbitrator pursuant to an arbitration clause and not by VCAT. The arbitration clause was contained in the a document separate from the lease. VCAT held that the agreement was a lease and therefore there was a “retail tenancy dispute” which, subject to the tenant’s argument about the Commercial Arbitration Act, would be governed by the dispute provisions of the RLA. If the tenant’s application had succeeded the whole regime of the dispute resolutions provisions in the RLA would have been displaced. The tenant argued that the arbitration clause should be given effect to because s 10 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 was pronounced after the commencement of the 2003 Act and, by implication, repealed the provisions…
View original post 474 more words
October 4, 2012
The Australian Financial Review today published an article reporting that an application for special leave to appeal the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in the Willmott case was filed last week.
The Court of Appeal held that a liquidator of a land owning company can use the disclaimer power in the Corporations Act to disclaim leases granted by the company.
For more discussion on the decision, refer to earlier posts here and here.
For those following the debate, I have also been referred to an interesting analysis of the decision by Minter Ellison available here.
The Australian Financial Review article is available here.
December 6, 2012
0 Comments